◇◇新语丝(www.xys.org)(xys.dxiong.com)(xys.3322.org)(xys.freedns.us)◇◇ 中国科技需要的根本转变:从传统人治到竞争优胜体制   --中长期规划将留下优秀遗产、还是错失良机   饶毅1 鲁白2 邹承鲁3   在2003年3月22日的中国新一届国务院第一次会议上,温家宝总理决 定制订国家中长期科技规划(其简介见框一),以指导今后15到20年的中国科 技发展。这既显示了政府对经济状况的信心、也强化了它相信科技对中国发展至 关重要的理念。   虽然中长期规划将对中国科学研究和技术发展提供重要动力(辅以大量的新 增经费),我们认为:在迄今进行的中长期规划讨论中,中国科技体制最根本的 问题没有得到足够的重视和认真的考虑。目前中长期规划的中心是提出和挑选每 个经费额达数十到百亿人民币的大课题。我们认为,中国科技发展还有根本的体 制问题没有解决:中国科技管理目前仍然停留在“人治”阶段,社会和科技界的 人际政治在多个层面起重要或主导作用, 而科技的专业优劣在现有体系不能发挥 合适的作用。我们认为科技管理应该采用“竞争优胜体制”,即真正按照科技项 目的专业水平及其意义来进行竞争和选择,使优势课题胜出。政治领袖可以决定 或影响科技与国家和社会有关的全局层面,而其它层面要由各行业的专家评审项 目优秀与否来确定科技项目经费分配,一般行政人员应该退出科技的决策和影响。 中国国家自然科学基金会的实践表明:建立可尽量减少问题的体制在中国是可行 的。比较科技部和自然科学基金,不难得出结论:科学经费从科技部转给自然科 学基金会就是一个可以较快地改善科学体制的方法。我们的讨论和建议是依据直 接参与中国科学研究和评审的经历,对中国和其它国家科研体制的切身了解和比 较,以及中国多年来发展趋势和现状的观察和思考。   如果中长期规划只简单地增加科技经费,而不解决上述的根本体制问题,中 国将事倍功半。目前大课题所涉及的一系列问题就说明不解决根本问题会导致中 国有些资源的相当浪费。大课题在形成、选择、今后管理和评估上的问题通常可 以追究到根本问题上。因为其资助课题强度大,中长期规划所带来的正负效应都 会比较深远。这里我们提出一些需要谨慎思考的问题,以期促进进一步的建设性 讨论,增加中长期规划和其它类似努力成功的可能性。有些意见也许比较尖锐, 可能触动一些人的利益。作者中有1951年剑桥毕业后回国工作五十多年的、也有 过去十年部分时间参与一些中国工作的。我们写作本文的目的是诚挚地希望其内 容能对中国有益。   “竞争优胜的科技体制”:从行政和科技的分界开始   国家对科技管理的一个关键环节是科技经费的分配体制。中国目前体制仍然 是人治为主。这部分原因是中国的历史传统、部分则是五十年前照搬苏联模式的 结果。政治和科技至少在三个方面关系严重错位。   第一,在国家层面,领导人有时被安排直接参与具体科技课题的选择。即使 在必需专业知识的时候,国家和(更常见的)部委领导人也参与选择科技课题。 这样的微观控制可以引入政治的或非专业的因素。   第二,专家被推到方便于搞学术政治、但不方便专业评审的场合。科技界人 士不能发挥专业优势就会落入人际政治。中国高额的科技经费一般是部委(如科 技部、国家发展改革委员会)组织,含概面很广:从纳米技术到癌症研究。部委 使专家参与超越其专长范围的评审。比如化学家可以被邀请到一个20个人左右的 专家评审委员会,从一堆包括等离子物理到植物发育的申请中挑选资助课题。因 为整个委员会没有任何专家可以判断这些竞争课题的相对优势,“专家”的评估 也就很难依据于课题的专业优劣。这样,由部委组织的大课题评审,科技界的人 际政治就常常代替专业的标准。人际关系、政治结盟--不管是科技界专业人士 之间的、还是专家和行政管理人员之间的--必然导致与科技价值无关的随意性。   第三,各部委中下层管理人员有过度的权力。科技部的司局长、处长、甚至 一般处员对科技经费分配有相当大的权力,包括设立项目、选择评审专家、影响 评审讨论、个人邀人提申请。行政人员常按自己的意愿来选择专家, 可以操纵或 影响决策过程。名义上的专业人员常无法提供专家意见,也助长行政人员的权力。 所以,中国科技人员一般很看重和科技部官员的关系,认为这样的关系对获得大 量经费起很重要的作用。   以上几方面综合造成的结果是,科技经费分配时政治和科技不分。当科技经 费分配机制错误时,就不能充分调动已经在中国的科技人士热心专业、他们的精 力就可能被分散到非专业事务上。中国新政府希望推进的招聘也受阻碍,因为可 能感兴趣的人难以有信心目前的体制能支持他们进行专业工作。如果人治科技的 体制不改,很难想象如何能避免浪费和贪污。   要从人治科技变到竞争优胜的体制,首先必须明确政治和科技的界限,分开 政治决定和科技专业决定。“政科分离”要从界定政治领导、专家、和行政人员 的作用开始。改善中国科技效率的改革有三个重要原则。虽然落实这三个原则需 要科技体制改革,这是目前中国已经可行的,因为这样的改革与中国目前的国家 政治体制还是一致的。其一,政治领袖可以依据社会需要,参考科技界领导及专 家意见,决定国家科技总体经费。政治领袖可以和科技领导及专家协商将总体经 费分成几大类。政治领袖只有在国家特别需要如国防和紧急情况下才过问具体课 题。其二,其它决定由各领域的专家来作,但专家评审委员会只评审专家们可以 理解其相对优势的竞争课题。其三,具体课题的选择必须由相应领域专家来作, 不能允许各个部门的行政人员控制和影响资助决定,而应该让他们回到服务的地 位。这些原则应该贯彻在变革后的体制中。   科技部改为总理科技办公室;专事政策和协调,经费管理转给已有的专门机 构   变革中国科技体制的一个当务之急是,应该认真考虑转变科技部的功能。目 前的科技部不能有效地推动中国科技进步,其存在方式使中国科技体制停留在计 划经济时代,是造成中国科技许多问题的重要原因。科技部大体有两大功能:一 是统筹科技政策、科研规划,二是组织科研项目、分配科研资金。前一功能由新 的总理科技办公室更合适,而后一功能则可分到各专门部委。这样也提高效率, 节省国家管理层面的费用。   科技发达国家,没有一个有像中国这么大权力的科技部。多数没有科技部, 如美国、英国、日本。少数有这样名称的(如德国研究和教育部),并不像中国 科技部那样控制全国科技经费的主要部分、其行政人员更没有主宰权力。中国科 技人员数额少于美国、总经费远低于美国,很难理解为何需要一个独立的、规模 庞大的部,以更高的管理成本来管理更少的人员和经费。是因为中国的行政管理 人员水平高于美国的,从而更有资格来“指导”中国科技人员吗?我们认为这也 没有事实基础。是中国没有其它行之有效的经费管理机构所以必须依赖科技部吗? 据我们所知,国家自然科学基金会是中国较有信誉、实际运作比较成功的经费管 理机构,和国际上行之有效的机构也相近,是管理中国科学经费更合适的机构。   科技部的诞生是五十年代老式苏联计划经济的产物。最初是苏联顾问建议中 国作科技规划,成立了科学和技术两个临时工作委员会,规划完成后在争议中成 为部级的国家科技委员会。力主保持这个经常机构的领导(如陈毅副总理)也是 要它在今后科技规划时起作用,并没有给予重要的日常运作。五、六十年代,科 技部并不管理中国科技经费。60年代它的规模实际上很小、以后曾消失。但是迄 今它已演化成一个控制大量科技经费的部门。   和其它部委不同的是,科技部没有明确的、可以评价的责任。粮食生产是农 业部的责任、卫生部要负责全国的医疗、科学院要产出国际上可以比较和评价的 研究发现以及国内有应用或者应用前景的成果。这些部委的工作成效都有一定检 验方法。而科技部没有可以检验的标准。国家经费下达到科技部后,如何应用经 费、其效果如何,它既没有上级检验、也没有下级压力。科技部没有下属实体, 经费分到全国科技机构,国家科技进步时,即使不是自己的原因,科技部也可以 归功于自己;落后或者成效不高时,科技部可以说自己不是直接运作机构,推托 责任给具体机构,这样一来,就无法严格评价科技部。所以,科技部各级行政人 员在管理项目上有很大的自主性和随意性。   科技部下属的每个司局管理的面太广。所以常将完全不同的项目放在一起、 名义上是“评审”,实际是利于科技部中下级行政人员控制科技专家,进行社会 和学术政治交易。科技部各司局功能自我定义是组织和领导科技。这一居高临下 的基本思想,也体现在科技部的工作中。许多科技人士——包括中国的精英—— 在科技部中下级官员面前都不能正常表达意见。科技部行政人员每过一段时间设 立新计划,其中相当多是行政人员的主观意识、而无需反映科技发展趋势和规律。 这就导致了中国科技人士围着行政人员的转。只要科技部继续管理大量经费,就 难以避免庸才继续影响或统治科技前沿人才。如果都有人建议还在海外的科学家 向科技部人员行贿、甚至出现行政人员直接向海外科学家索贿的行为,也就不难 想象行政人员对国内科研人员是如何对待的。这些都是因为行政人员享有过度权 力的缘故。   我们建议:将科技部迄今控制的科学经费分到国家自然科学基金会这样有合 理体制的基金管理机构,和中国科学院、教育部等直接进行科学研究的部门。而 科技部的技术经费则依据专业分到专门部委如农业部、卫生部、信息产业部等等。 这些专业部委可以更直接、有效地应用相应的经费和运作课题。目前,国家自然 科学基金会只评审小规模的课题,大课题由部委管理而缺乏严格评审。这造成了 中国熟知的问题:小钱大审,大钱小审。事实上,比较合理的是自然科学基金会 接管科技部的科学经费。自然科学基金不是不需要改进和完善,但是自然科学基 金在竞争、专业评审、利益冲突等方面都用了相对更好的规章制度,而且在实践 上也是中国目前最好的体制。可以说任何认真地观察过其工作的人,都不会否定 这样的客观结论:即使完全用目前的自然科学基金机制,也可以比科技部更合理 而有效地管理科学经费,管理成本将低于科技部。也就是说,现有的、行之有效 的机制可以立即替代科技部的科学经费分配功能。我们要说明,自然科学基金会 也是有需要改进的方面,但其大体结构已经是中国科学经费管理目前最有效的, 比较容易接管科技部的科学经费。这样的改变可以较快地牵动全国的研究机构和 大学,它们将注重研究的专业优劣、而不继续重视与科技部官员的人际关系:自 然科学基金评审过程中,虽然没有杜绝行政人员的影响,其影响要比科技部里面 的小。   改革后的总理科技办公室不直接控制大量科技经费,反而可以起现有所有科 技机构不能起的作用。虽然从官员管理经费的角度看,权力会减少很多。但是如 果从国家科技发展的利益来看,总理科技办公室可以发挥中国目前欠缺和急需的 作用:它可以比较不计私利地为总理提供科技咨询,可以为国家利益和科技发展 献计献策,可以真心制订有利于国家发展的科技政策。如果需要的话,它还可以 制订措施监督和检验其它机构经费分配效率和应用效果。对于特别需要协调不同 部门的政策和项目,未来的总理科技办公室可以经总理授权进行跨部门的协调。 这样的协调是有限的,不需一个庞大的常设部委。   与科技有关的各个政府层面应该设立一系列顾问和咨询委员会或小组。由科 技专家组成的这些委员会提供建议,涉及科技政策、拨款和经费分配、新计划和 战略考虑等。   所有与科技经费分配有关的政府部门,需要建立严格的专业优势为基础的评 审体制。国家自然科学基金会已经在用的体制是可以供其它部门参照的一个模式。   中长期规划大课题:放大已有的问题   中长期规划要支持大科技课题,很快引起争论。本来科技发展到一定时候, 可以出现大小不同的课题。问题不在于是否有大课题,而在于为什么有大课题、 是否经常有大课题、如何评审选择大课题、如何检验大课题的成效。在中国还没 有妥善解决体制问题的情况下,推出大课题在效果和方向上就不大容易令人满意。   科技发达国家也有大课题,但是起源不同、方式不同。比如美国的人类基因 组计划是科学家们提出、并经过争论后向政府提出,是科学技术发展到一定时候 而提出的,不是政府说有科技经费、科学界就马上有大课题。平时,中国一些部 委也每过几年就设立一些计划,通常也是比较大的课题,这些计划多数是官员和 行政人员为主导想出来的。   中长期规划中有关大课题的形成和选择说明了目前科技管理的弊病。整个过 程中,都有科技部其它大课题的通病,只是在数量级上再放大了。课题的提出没 有竞争,是少数行政人员指定少数专业人员,内部讨论形成。虽然让许多人开了 许多会,多数都是走过场、无实际效果。最后提出时没有真正竞争,而是科技界 少数人进行学术政治的结果。整个过场也被科技部的行政人员掌握,评审不依据 专业优劣做竞争和比较,决定业就缺乏充分的客观依据。   课题提出的方式由提议的量小(少于20)和每个课题经费的规模所决定了。 课题提议必然面很宽、让政治领导看来有社会意义。脱离了具体科技专业优劣, 很多课题都可以说出简单的社会意义,这样的比较没有深度。为了平衡各个领域 的利益,课题提议常将许多不同的小课题放在同一大旗底下,其过程不是真正的 科学创造力或者技术创新,而是描绘和包装。同样的做法过去常见于863、973等 计划,不过现在的中长期规划课题经费又高一、二个数量级了。这个做法将阻碍 真正依据科技优势竞争的体系形成。   大课题得到资助后如何评审也是一个问题。如果这些课题由选择这些课题的 部委(多半是科技部)来评审,即使出现问题和错误,也不太可能被承认,因为 大经费应用失败会直接影响部委及其官员的政绩和可信性。此外,今天中国在某 领域有足够专长的人员数量不多。一个大课题就可以包括大多数(如果不是所有) 可以懂得该领域的人,这样就没有什么人能留在外面提供客观和有批评性的评审 了。中国专业人员都懂这一点,所以,当其课题被资助后,就没有很大的压力要 达到目的。   鉴于资助大课题的高度危险性,一个可能是将一部分大课题经费转移到其它 部门,如国家自然科学基金会去。那些机构再到不同领域接受大、中、小型课题 提议,并进行竞争性评审。课题的大小要和各个研究领域需要相当,要避免专业 人员因为政府已经决定的经费规模来把课题成比例放大的趋向。   中长期规划的历史遗产:重要的选择   中长期规划及相关大课题的成败可能成为本届政府的重要遗产。这个遗产将 成为历史长期铭记的优秀遗产?还是将被认为错失良机、甚至造成浪费?这是一 个严肃的选择。   已故的周恩来总理和他同辈的领袖们,领导了1956年的国家科技发展规划, 其支持核武器和太空计划(“两弹一星”)的决策和成就一直为人赞誉。然而不 能忘记的是,虽然不像“两弹一星”那样容易向公众描述,56年的规划更重要的 贡献,也许在于科技总体经费的增加、科技院所的建立、大学及其新系科的设立。 在当时条件下,建立尽可能好的中国科学技术研究的结构体系是周恩来等的功绩。   如果说,“两弹一星”等是周恩来一代的丰碑的话,有部分原因是当时有明 确的、中国急切需要的科技大课题。而目前,和其它多数和平时代一样,并没有 那样清楚的目标,可以简单地用几个大课题来解决。   对于国家领导人来说,建立良好的科技体制,让中国国内优秀科技专业人才 发挥创造性,专心在他们的专业上作出成就,是比具体科技大课题更重要的课题。 将来的历史也许会显示中长期规划的重要遗产不是确立具体的大课题,而是它对 中国科技体制和中国可持续发展的长期影响力。中国科技管理体制迄今远落后于 经济:在计划经济已实质变成竞争的市场经济后,如果科技管理还是计划时代的 产物,没有根本的变革,中国科技进步就被体制延缓 。   良好体制的确立,不是目前中国科技专业人员完全靠本身能做到的。如果新 一代领导人有长远眼光、能注重解决长期影响中国科技的根本问题,而不仅聚集 于具体大课题,那么,今后相当长期的中国科技进展都可以追溯到本届政府对科 技变革之功业。可以说,华盛顿的历史功绩不是他具体解决了某个大项目(如战 争积累的国债、对法国的谈判),而是他那一辈的政治家促成了国家长远体制的 建立。在一定程度上,这也可以类比中国科技体制的变革。在有条件的时候,转 变了体制,是影响长远的历史功绩。如果让时机流失,将留下遗憾。    ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------   1美国西北大学教授、神经科学研究所副所长,中国科学院上海交叉学科研 究中心共同主任。   2美国国立健康研究院实验室主任,中国科技部科学顾问。   3中国科学院院士、生物物理研究所研究员。   2004年11月18日发表于《自然》“中国之声II”特辑   Rao, Y., Lu, B., & C.-L. Tsou: Nature 432 (Suppl), A12-A17, November 18, 2004.    ______________________________________________________________________ ___   BOX   国家中长期规划   2003年开始的国家中长期规划领导小组由温家宝总理为组长,包括国务委员 和几个部委首脑。科技部负责管理协调中长期规划,并组织一个由科技界领袖组 成的顾问委员会。   过去一年来,科技部组织了20个规划小组,开了许多会。这些活动号称包括 了数以千计的科学家、工程师、医生等。讨论的议题包罗各种科技方面,从环境、 大型飞机到绕月飞行。   中长期规划中心任务之一是由各规划小组提出一系列重大科研课题。另由重 大项目评审小组审议这些课题,并向总理和领导小组建议课题资助。虽然没有公 开宣布,据信20个规划小组将提出大约50个大课题,将选出10到20个大课题给资 助,资助强度将在十到百亿人民币。   这些课题的资助强度以任何一种国际标准衡量都是高的。在中国,这样的一 个课题可以超过目前国家自然科学基金年度经费的总额、甚至超过自然科学基金 1986年成立迄今18年的总经费。相比来看,美国的大科学计划,如人类基因组计 划, 虽然也是大课题,其资助从来只是美国国立健康研究院年度经费的一小部 分。   大课题的强资助使之成为中长期规划的核心,使其它方面黯然失色,包括机 构和行政管理体制改革。中长期规划的大课题吸引了中国科技机构及其科学家、 工程师的瞩目。他们视之为承载本机构和自己事业的一趟列车。这趟车会将中国 科技载向何方?其效率如何? A Fundamental Transition from Rule-by-Man to Rule-by-Merit - What Will Be the Legacy of the Mid-to-Long Term Plan of Science and Technology? Yi Rao1, Bai Lu2 and Chen-Lu Tsou3 In the first cabinet meeting after the inauguration of the new Chinese administration on March 22, 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao decided to initiate a national plan on science and technology (S&T) for the next 15 to 20 years, known as the National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T (MLP, see the Box). It indicates the government’s confidence in the state of economy and reinforces the view that S&T is critical to further development of China. While the MLP will provide a major impetus (with substantial new funding) for S&T in China, we believe that the most fundamental problem in the Chinese S&T system has not been properly deliberated so far in the MLP. The current emphasis of the MLP is dominated by the creation and selection of “megaprojects”, projects with funding in the order of hundred of millions to billions of US dollars. We believe that the fundamental problem in Chinese S&T is that it is still in the stage of “Rule-by-Man”, in which politics (both social and academic) plays either an important or a dominant role at multiple levels. A more desirable system is “Rule-by-Merit” – in which merits determined by professionals with expertise in specific fields is the dominant factor in distributing funds in S&T, and political decisions are made only at the global level where societal and national needs are concerned, whereas regular administrators should be excluded from making or influencing S&T decisions. The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC) has shown through its 18 years of existence that it is feasible to establish mechanisms that can minimize problems in China. By comparing the NNSFC with the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), it is not difficult to conclude that the reassignment of the Chinese science budget from the MOST to the NNSFC is an immediate way to significantly improve the funding mechanism. Our conclusions and suggestions discussed below are based on our experiences in participating in scientific research and reviews in Chinese institutions, and comparative analysis of the strength and weakness of the Chinese system with those of other countries. It will be unfortunate if the MLP simply means that China will rush to increase S&T funding without solving the fundamental problem. There are problems with formulation, selection, management and evaluation of MLP megaprojects, which can often be attributed to the fundamental problem. Due to the sheer size of the potential funding associated with MLP funded projects, both positive and negative impacts of the MLP will be significant and long-lasting. Here we provide some cautious notes, with an aim to stimulate further constructive discussions that may help to improve the chance for the success of the MLP and similar endeavors. Some of our suggestions may diminish the power of administrators and their entrenched interests. It is the sincere hope of the authors, one of whom has returned to work in China for more than 50 years after graduating from Cambridge in 1951 and the other two have contributed part-time efforts in the last 10 years, that this article can be useful to S&T in China. Achieving Rule-by-Merit: Separation of Political and Professional Decisions A major mechanism for a government to influence S&T is through its distribution of public funds. The present funding mechanism in China S&T remains essentially a system of Rule-by-Man, partly due to the tradition in Chinese society, partly due to the transplantation of the Soviet style 50 years ago. There are at least 3 areas where the relationship between politics and S&T is confused. First, at the national level, political leaders are sometimes placed in the position of selecting S&T projects. It is awkward that, even when specialized professional knowledge is required, national and, more often, cabinet-level, leaders can be directly involved in the selection of S&T projects. Political or non-professional considerations can over-step the borders when micromanagement is instituted. Second, S&T professionals are placed on panels that are more convenient for academic politics than for professional reviews and evaluations. Professionals will then be involved in academic politics when they can not rely on professional judgment. In China, projects with large budgets are controlled by ministries such as the MOST or the State Commission on Development (SCD). They cover areas that range from nanotechnology to cancer research. These ministries often make professional experts judge projects beyond the scope of their expertise. A typical example is that a chemist can sit on a panel of approximately 20 “experts” who select projects from a pile of proposals including plasma physics and plant development. Because not a single expert on the panel can evaluate the relative merits of the competing proposals, the judgment of the “experts” can hardly be based on professional merits. As a result, academic politics often replace professional criteria during the selection of large projects organized by the ministries. Personal relationships and political alliances among professionals or between professionals and their political or administrative patronage lead to arbitrariness unrelated to the intrinsic S&T values. Third, middle- and low- level administrators in the ministries are allowed too much power and influence in S&T decisions. For example, bureau chiefs, unit chiefs, and even regular administrators of MOST have considerable influence in establishing programs, selecting review panelists, influencing panel discussions, and personal solicitation of proposals. It is a general perception in China that personal relationship with MOST officials is in securing large amounts of funding. Taken together, these result in close entanglement of politics (being it societal or academic) with S&T funding decisions. Major concerns with the mechanism for distributing S&T funds makes it difficult to motivate S&T professionals to put their major efforts on research or invention when distraction by non-professional interests or activities seems to be very helpful for their funding situations. It hampers the new Chinese government in its efforts to recruit highly trained and dedicated professionals when prospective applicants do not have sufficient confidence in the present system for its support of their professional development. If the Rule-by-Man system is not changed, it is also difficult to imagine how waste and corruption are can be avoided. To achieve the transition from Rule-by-Man to Rule-by-Merit, it is essential to delineate the border between politics and S&T, so that political decisions are separate from professional decisions. The separation of politics and S&T can begin with defining the roles of the political leadership, the professionals and the administrators. There are three principles that are important to reform the S&T system that will improve the efficiency of the Chinese S&T. Although instituting these principles requires changes in S&T management, they are presently feasible since they are compatible with the current political structure of China. First, political leaders can decide on the overall funding levels based on societal needs and consultations with professional leaders. Political leaders, together with S&T leaders and professional advice, can divide the pie of S&T funding to major sectors. Political leaders can be involved in specific projects only in special situations such as national defense needs or emergencies. Secondly, professionals should play major roles in the decision for funding projects. They should serve on review panels that present them with competing proposals whose relative merits they can understand, evaluate and deliberate. Thirdly, bureaucrats in various agencies should not be allowed to control or influence funding decisions, but rather be required to play the appropriate roles of support and service. Changing the MOST to an Office of S&T Operationally, the function of MOST should be seriously re-considered. The present MOST is not efficient in advancing S&T in China, with its mechanisms of operation molded by the old Soviet style planned economy which has been outdated in China. MOST has two general roles: one in formulating S&T policy and plans, and the other in organizing S&T programs or projects and distributing funds. We believe that the first role can be more effectively played by a prospective Premier’s Office of S&T, whereas the second role can be relegated to specialize agencies. It will increase efficiency and decrease the cost of government management. In countries with more developed S&T, no ministry with powers as sweeping as the Chinese MOST exists to control S&T. Most countries, such as the US, Britain and Japan, do not have a ministry on S&T. In the few countries in which there is a ministry with similar title (such as the Ministry of Research and Education in Germany), they do not control the major budget for S&T and their administrators do not play such dominant roles as those enjoyed by the administrators in the Chinese MOST. With the total number of S&T professionals in China less than that in the US, and the overall budget of Chinese S&T well below that in the US, it is difficult to explain the existence of an extra and large ministry with more administrative cost to manage S&T in China. There is also no evidence that Chinese administrators are better trained or more qualified than US administrators to “instruct” (as the word often used in China in this context) S&T professionals in China. Is it then because China lacks other effective agencies for managing S&T budgets so that it has to rely on MOST? This also turns out to be untrue, at least for the science part of S&T, because the NNSFC has a much better reputation and is more efficient in distributing funds for science. NNSFC has adopted the principles of the US NSF and has proven to the Chinese scientists to be more reliable, more effective and more professional than MOST. The birth of MOST was a product of old Soviet style of planned economy. In fact, it was a Soviet advisor who suggested the Chinese government to initiate national plans on S&T, for which two temporary committees were formed in the 1950s: one on science planning and the other on technology planning. It was controversial when they were merged into a cabinet-level Commission after the completion of the 1956 plan. Even those who argued for the establishment of a regular standing ministry (such as the then Vice Premier Chen Yi) only supported it to play roles in S&T planning, without a powerful role of distributing funds. The S&T Commission did not manage funds. It was small in the 1960s and disappeared for a while. However, it has evolved into a ministry controlling a large amount of S&T funds now. The scope covered by each bureau of MOST is very broad. The resulting amalgamation of programs and projects in each bureau or its divisions causes the reviews to be nominal and makes it easy for administrators to control professionals in social and academic politics. Each bureau of MOST defines itself to “organize” and “lead” certain (large) aspect of S&T, which is accompanied by condescension towards professionals. Many S&T professionals including elitists in China have a hard time expressing their honest opinions in front of MOST officials and administrators. Every once in a while MOST administrators initiate new programs, reflecting their whims more than the true needs and development of S&T. Consequently, Chinese S&T professionals often dance to the tunes set by the administrators. As long as the MOST controls a large amount of S&T budget, the rule of Chinese S&T professionals by mediocre administrators is hardly avoidable. It is not difficult to imagine how the administrators treat professionals inside China if one learns that overseas Chinese professionals have been suggested to bribe the administrators or that some administrators have asked overseas professionals for bribes. The excessive empowerment in administrators is a major cause for these. We suggest: 1) that the science budget currently in MOST be reassigned to other agencies such as the more reputable funding agency NNSFC, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Ministry of Education (MOE) whose institutes or universities conduct scientific research, and 2) that the technology budget of MOST be reassigned to specialized ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), or the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) and the Ministry of Information Industries. These agencies can more effectively manage the funds and run the projects with their lower level institutes. At the present, NNSFC, which has a more rigorous reviewing mechanism, supports projects with moderate funds, whereas the ministries provide generous funds with little reviewing. It will be reasonable for the NNSFC to take over the role of funding science from the MOST. It is not that the NNSFC has no room for improvement, but that it has instituted better mechanisms for competition, professional reviewing and conflict-of-interest rules, which have proven to work in China. It is safe to state that anyone who has carefully witnessed their operations will reach an objective conclusion: that the current NNSFC can manage funding for science more rigorously, more efficiently, and less costly than the MOST. This demonstrates that an existing mechanism can immediately replace the function of the MOST in managing the science budget. We note that there are aspects in the NNSFC that do require further improvement, but it is relatively easy to reassign science budget to the NNSFC now. The reassignment will have immediate impact on institutions conducting research throughout China. They will have to devote more time and efforts on professional excellence, and refrain from cultivating relationships with MOST officials or other administrators, because, although influences by administrators in the NNSFC are not completely absent, they are significantly less than those in the MOST; professional merits are more important in NNSFC reviews. The prospective Premier’s Office of S&T, after giving up the control of funding, can play roles that are needed in China. Although the power of this office will appear smaller than the MOST in the perspective of administrative control of funds, it can play roles that are not played by other agencies. It can provide advice on S&T to the Premier without self-promotion for more funds under its own control, and formulate policies and regulations based on national interests for the development of S&T. If necessary, it can also establish mechanisms to monitor the appropriateness and the efficiency of fund distribution by other agencies. For special cases or under special circumstances, it can also obtain the permission of the Premier to coordinate programs or projects that require the participation of institutions from multiple ministries. Advisory committees and counseling groups with real power should be established at various levels in S&T-related government agencies. These groups, consisting of experts in S&T, can provide advice and recommendations on S&T policies, appropriation and fund distribution, new initiatives, and strategic considerations. Rigorous merit-based review mechanisms should be established in all S&T-related government agencies for resource allocation. The mechanism used by the NNSFC could serve as a model. Concerns with MLP Megaprojects Controversies have arisen about megaprojects in the MLP. It is natural that the size of projects can differ as science and technology develop. The major concerns are therefore not with the question whether there should be large projects, but with the underlying reason for soliciting large projects, the frequency that the government should solicit large projects, and the selection and the performance evaluation of large projects. Before significant improvement of the funding mechanism in China, it is unlikely that the direction and efficiency of large projects will provide maximal positive stimulation to Chinese S&T. There are large projects in more developed countries, but the origin of those projects is different from that in China. For example, the Human Genome Project in the US was proposed by scientists who believed that it was time to sequence the human genome, and debated among scientists before it was funded by the government. It is not that, if a government has more funds, then scientists can immediately come up with big projects. In addition to megaprojects in the MLP, Chinese ministries also often come up with programs to fund large projects, again in the mode of funds leading projects, not projects leading funds. In the process formulating and selecting megaprojects in the MLP, problems with MOST projects are often repeated and amplified. Proposals for projects often have no or little competition. The small number of proposals to be selected (less than 20) and the size of each project have dictated the way proposals are formulated. A project must be broad in scope, inclusive in its participants, and appealing to the political leadership or administrators in “social” implications. Without specialized assessment of professional merits, there is little depth to argue about simplified social implications. In order to balance the interests of various areas, it appears that the formulation of the proposal involves grouping many different research areas under one large banner, an exercise of window dressing and packaging, rather than scientific creativity or technological innovation. Such exercises have been practiced in the past for previous large projects, e.g., 863 and 973 programs, although the size of funding is now larger by up to two orders of magnitude. This practice becomes an obstacle for a truly competitive merit-based funding system. One concern is how megaprojects are evaluated after they are funded. If these projects are managed and supervised by the same agency (the MOST again) that is largely responsible for the selection and funding of the projects, problems and failures associated with the projects are unlikely to be admitted because it will directly affect the credibility of the agency and the promotion of its administrators. Furthermore, the total pool of professionals with a sufficient level of expertise in any given area is relatively small in the present day China. One megaproject can include most, if not all, active researchers in that area, thereby leaving few or no experts who can provide objective and critical evaluation. Chinese researchers understand this well and, once their proposals are funded, will have little pressure to achieve the proclaimed goals. Given the high risk associated with funding megaprojects, an alternative is to reduce their funding, or divert a substantial amount of funds to existing agencies such as the NNSFC, which can then solicit proposals for large, medium and small projects in various fields, and review them on a competitive basis. The size of the projects must depend on research needs to eliminate the possibility for professionals to scale the size of projects in proportion to the government’s predetermined funding capability. The Legacy of MLP: an Important Choice The success or failure of the MLP and its associated megaprojects may well become a major legacy of the current administration. Will it be remembered as a major contribution for furthering the development of S&T in China? Or a missed opportunity? It involves an important choice. The late Premier Zhou Enlai and his generation of leaders, who led the 1956 S&T plan, has often been credited for their determination and success in supporting the nuclear and space programs in China. Although less striking to the general public, it should be remembered that major achievements of the 1956 plan also include the overall increase of S&T funding, and the establishment of research institutes and universities. It can be argued that the legacy of Zhou and colleagues lies more in their establishment of the foundation and infrastructure of S&T in China. If the nuclear and space programs serve as monuments to Zhou’s generation, it is partly because there were well-defined S&T projects urgently needed by China at the time. At the present, as in most peace time, there are few well-defined goals that can be solved by a few simple megaprojects. For the national leadership, a project bigger in impact and significance than all the MLP megaprojects is to establish mechanisms in S&T that will allow professionals in China to achieve their full professional potentials and to focus their time and efforts on their professional activities. Future history will perhaps show that the legacy of MLP lies not in specific megaprojects that it supports, but in its long-term impacts on the Chinese S&T infrastructure for sustained development of China. The Chinese S&T institutions and management systems have lagged far behind the economic sector, where the planned economy has been essentially replaced with a competitive and market-driven economy. The S&T system in China needs to readjust to catch up with economic development in China. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------ 1Professor of Neurology and the Deputy Director of the Institute of Neuroscience at Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois, USA, and the Co-director of the Shanghai Institute for Advanced Studies (SIAS) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS); 2Chief of the Section on Neural Development and Plasticity at NICHD of the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland, USA, and a Scientific Advisor to the Ministry of Science and Technology of China; 3Academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and an Investigator in the CAS Institute of Biophysics in Beijing, China _______________________________________________________________ BOX National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T The leading group of National Mid-to-Long Term Plan for S&T (abbreviated as MLP hereafter) includes Premier Wen Jiabao and a small number of ministers. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is in charge of managing MLP and for organizing an advisory committee consisting of leaders in S&T. Over the past year, MOST has organized a large number of meetings, panel discussions, and regular sessions of 20 planning subgroups. These activities purportedly have involved thousands of scientists, engineers, physicians, and managers, etc.. Multiple S&T topics have been discussed, ranging from environmental issues to manufacture of airplanes and rotation around the moon. A central component is a set of “megaproject” proposals by various subgroups that will compete for funding from the government in the coming years. The “Group of Important Projects” will review the proposals and makes recommendations to the Premier and his Leading Group, which will make the final decisions. Although details have not been made public, it is commonly assumed that 10 to 20 projects will be selected among approximately 50 proposals from the 20 subgroups, with each project funded in the range of 1 to 10 billion Chinese RMB (or 100 million to 1 billion USD). The scale of these megaprojects is large by any international standard. One MLP project will be supported by a budget exceeding the entire annual budget of the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC), which is currently the major funding agency for investigator-initiated projects for all natural sciences. The funding level for some megaprojects may be larger than the total amount invested in the NNSFC for the past 18 years since its founding in 1986. By contrast, the Human Genome Project in the US, although a megaproject in its own right, never cost more than a moderate fraction of the total annual NIH budget. The sheer magnitude of funding for megaprojects outshines other aspects associated with MLP, which includes reforms of institutional and administrative structures and management mechanisms. The MLP megaprojects have attracted the attention of Chinese research institutions and leading scientists and engineers, who view these projects as a gravy train that will carry their institutions and their own careers forward in the next two decades. But where will it lead Chinese S&T overall? (XYS20041117) ◇◇新语丝(www.xys.org)(xys.dxiong.com)(xys.3322.org)(xys.freedns.us)◇◇